The Afghan War: Spreading Democracy (and Heroin)

[mightiswrong]

"Leaked documents reveal US and Afghan government collusion with major traffickers.

Documents made public by WikiLeaks' latest file drop show that Afghan President Hamid Karzai pulled strings several times throughout early 2009 to free numerous drug traffickers with whom he had political or economic ties.

The documents also show that US officials have held multiple high-level meetings with a man widely viewed as one of the country's major heroin dealers.

That man is Ahmed Wali Karzai: He's the half-brother of President Karzai and has been investigated by numerous major newspapers for drug allegations.

Referred to in many US documents as "AWK," Ahmed Wali Karzai, has long been on the radar of government officials and journalists for his off-the-books dealings with local warlords, traffickers, Taliban members and Afghanistan government officials.

Now, previously secret US Embassy documents, made public by WikiLeaks, further these claims. The documents also show that the US has continued to consult with AWK on major infrastructure projects, security contracts and economic plans.

One of the leaked documents is a report from a November 2009 meeting between AWK and the US Ambassador to Afghanistan, Karl Eikenberry. In this document, Eikenberry describes Karzai as being, "... widely understood to be corrupt and a narcotics trafficker." Nevertheless, he cautions that working with Karzai is a political necessity.

In this meeting, Karzai calls for private "jihadi" mercenaries operating within the region to fall under his control; he also calls for major development projects to be initiated with his oversight. Eikenberry responds, "... given AWK's reputation for shady dealings, his recommendations for large, costly infrastructure projects should be viewed with a healthy dose of skepticism."

He also notes that Karzai, "... is understood to have a stake in private security contracting ..." and "... both he and the governor have tried to exert control over how contracts are awarded in the province ... all of which could be a significant conflict of interest in the province."

In another document, made public by WikiLeaks, there is a report from a February 2010 meeting with AWK in which, then-Deputy Ambassador to Afghanistan Francis Ricciardone says that Karzai, "... appears not to understand the level of our knowledge of his activities and that the coalition views many of his activities as malign."

This new information linking the Karzai's with the heroin trade supplements previous reports on AWK's operations in Kandahar. It also further emphasizes the realities of the "dirty war" in Afghanistan.

In 2008, The New York Times released reports that Ahmed Wali Karzai was extensively linked to the heroin trade. An investigative report, in late 2009, declared that Karzai was, "... a suspected player in the country's booming illegal opium trade."(1)

The report also announced (citing, "current and former American officials") that Karzai, "... gets regular payments from the Central Intelligence Agency and has for much of the past eight years."(2)

According to The New York Times, the Bush White House said it, "... believes that Ahmed Wali Karzai is involved in drug trafficking," and, "Neither the Drug Enforcement Administration, which conducts counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan, nor the fledgling Afghan anti-drug agency, has pursued investigations into the accusations against the president's brother." (3)

The Times article also extensively quotes a jailed, high-level Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) informant, named Hajji Aman Kheri. "It's no secret about Wali Karzai and drugs," he told them. "A lot of people in the Afghan government are involved in drug trafficking."(4)

Other examples of such immunity were recently made public by WikiLeaks as well.

In April 2009, President Karzai pardoned five border policemen who were caught smuggling 124 kilograms of heroin in their patrol vehicles. They were sentenced to terms of 16 to 18 years each, only to be pardoned by President Karzai shortly after, "on the grounds that they were distantly related to two individuals who had been martyred during the civil war."

Rumors in the US Embassy are that Karzai is also planning on pardoning several other men caught smuggling heroin. One man was a high-ranking police chief and nephew of a member of Parliament, who was caught ordering his men to smuggle heroin. Another man was a "priority DEA target."

The same document says that Karzai tampered with the case of a narcotics trafficker whose father is a wealthy businessman and Karzai supporter. "Without any constitutional authority," the embassy cable says, "Karzai ordered the police to conduct a second investigation which resulted in the conclusion that the defendant had been framed."

These documents come after controversy arose last year when former Afghan Defense Minister and current First Vice President Muhammad Fahim was selected as Karzai's running mate. CIA reports sent to the White House in 2002 suggested that Fahim was involved in narcotics trafficking and, though the White House avoided public criticism, they privately directed American military trainers to work with Fahim's subordinates only, but not with Fahim himself.

President Karzai's other brothers have also made headlines this year for their secret dealings. Abdul Qayum Karzai mediated secret talks with the Taliban in Saudi Arabia. Mahmood Karzai has come under a federal investigation for tax evasion, racketeering and extortion.

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Now, documents leaked to the Guardian tell of Fahim's predecessor, former Afghan Vice-President Ahmed Zia Massoud, arriving in Dubai with 52 million dollars in cash and not needing to explain it. The reports outline the extent to which money has been smuggled out of Afghanistan by corrupt officials, and that Afghan officials have consistently lied about these "capital flights."

Another major figure under suspicion for selling drugs happens to be one of the main men charged with stopping them. Former Counter-Narcotics Deputy Minister Muhhamad Daud Daud, who came out of the Mujahideen under Ahmad Shah Massoud and became one of Afghanistan's biggest military commanders, is also in the mix.

While publicly assisting the US in counternarcotics policy, Daud Daud profits from the industry. According to The Guardian UK, "several western officials" allege that Daud Daud, "... has historical and family links to smuggling."(5)

A 2009 investigation by the Canadian Globe and Mail, found evidence that Daud Daud was deeply involved in the heroin industry. This investigation tells of a man named Sayyed Jan. In the story, he was stopped by members of the Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan, with 183 kilograms of pure heroin in his car.(6)

"The drug dealer was carrying a signed letter of protection from General Mohammed Daud Daud," the report says.(7)

"That document, along with other papers and interviews with well-placed sources, show that General Daud has safeguarded shipments of illegal opiates even as he commands thousands of officers sworn to fight the trade," the investigation concludes.(8)

According to the family members of the arrested trafficker, Jan paid General Daud Daud $50,000 to allow him to make a single trafficking run. Jan was later bribed out of prison and is believed to be once again leading his trafficking operation.

This is a glimpse of how one smuggles heroin out of Afghanistan: Pay off the officials who are supposed to be stopping you. It's an open-secret in the world capital of heroin.

"As of mid-February 2007," an internal military file from April 2007 states, "Afghan government officials working with eradication forces [are] accepting bribes from local farmers."(9)

This report describes farmers paying between $750 and $1,000 per acre for protection from corrupt officials. This amount of money is not something the average farmer can afford to pay, thus, one can assume that these pay-offs are made by large landowners.(10)

The document concludes that the police chief and "other provincial officials" are involved; and that Helmand provincial Governor Wafa was fully aware of the situation.(11)

In July 2010, The Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control, issued a report stating, "... most experts we spoke with agree that corruption at all levels of government enables narcotics trafficking."(12)

The report goes on to describe that members of the Afghan government have historically, "... rendered many aspects of the counternarcotics program useless, including using the eradication program as a means of extorting and by robbing alternative livelihood programs of resources intended for the Afghan farmer."(13)

It also cites research which found, "... there is a growing belief in the south (of Afghanistan) that those working for the government are more actively involved in the trade in narcotics that the Taliban."(14)

This study found that the vast majority of farmers understand the central government to be highly involved in the narcotics industry.

This information is even more alarming when laid next the UN's own statistics on the Afghan heroin trade.

As of 2009, the Taliban's share of opium-profits is estimated at 125 million dollars only. This means that the other 2 billion, 875 million dollars must go to either corrupt government officials or other warlords/drug networks.(15)

The US is in the middle of a drug war, backing men whom they know to be warlords and heroin traffickers in exchange for their political cooperation against groups like the Taliban, Hezb-e-Islami and the Haqqani Network, which oppose the current Afghan government and the US presence that keeps it afloat.

The US used this strategy in the 1980s as well, when it backed the Afghan Mujahideen rebels to combat Russia's bloody occupation. Its support for some of the most undemocratic and notorious warlords in the Mujahideen resulted in a decade of civil war that led to the Taliban's rise to power.

And, as it did in the 1980s, when covert US government funding supported the anti-Soviet insurgency, the US is working with some of the most undemocratic and notorious warlords in the country.

The blowback from such alliances today will probably be similar.


1. Dexter Filkins, Mark Mazzetti and James Risen, "Brother of Afghan Leader Said to Be Paid by CIA," New York Times, October 27, 2009.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Declan Walsh, "Afghan province to provide one-third of world's heroin," Guardian UK, June 14, 2006.
6. Graeme Smith, "Afghan officials in drug trade cut deals across enemy lines," The Global and Mail, March 21, 2009.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9. WikiLeaks, "Afghan Eradication Officials Accepted Bribes in Helmand Province."
10. Ibid.11. Ibid.
12. Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control, 111th Congress second session, "US Counternarcotics Strategy in Afghanistan," July 2010. 13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. UN Office on Drugs and Crime, "Addiction, Crime and Insurgency, The Transnational Threat of Afghan Opium," October 2009.

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This work by Truthout is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 3.0 United States License. "
http://www.truth-out.org/the-afghan-...nd-heroin65816

[mightiswrong]

"Viewing cable 10KABUL693, AHMED WALI KARZAI: SEEKING TO DEFINE HIMSLEF AS U.S. PARTNER?

Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10KABUL693 2010-02-25 04:04 2010-12-02 21:09 SECRET Embassy Kabul

VZCZCXRO2601
OO RUEHDBU RUEHPW RUEHSL
DE RUEHBUL #0693/01 0560405
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 250405Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5873
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

SECRET SECTION 01 of 03 KABUL 000693

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SRAP, SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM, INR/B
STATE PASS USAID FOR ASIA/SCAA
USFOR-A FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/25/2020
TAGS: PGOV KCOR KCRM PREL AF
SUBJECT: AHMED WALI KARZAI: SEEKING TO DEFINE HIMSLEF AS U.S. PARTNER?

REF: A. (a) KABUL 673
¶B. (b) 09 KABUL 3068

Classified By: Interagency Provincial Affairs Deputy Director Hoyt Yee
for Reasons 1.4(b) and (d)

¶1. (S//Rel NATO, ISAF) Begin Summary. Senior Civilian
Representative (SCR) Frank Ruggiero met one-on-one with Ahmed
Wali Karzai (AWK) on February 23. SCR informed AWK that
coalition attention will turn to Kandahar in the next phase
of Operation Moshtarak (Together) and the United States will
play a far greater role in Kandahar on the military and
civilian sides. SCR outlined the coalition governance
strategy for Kandahar and cautioned ISAF will seek
non-interference by powerbrokers in police matters. AWK
discussed the recent capture of Taliban leader Mullah Baradar
in Kandahar, district and provincial-level politics, Kandahar
economics and security, the role of xxxxxxxxxxxx
narcotics, a southern Pashtoon political party,
competition with Nangarhar Governor Gulaga Sherzai, and AWK's
life in Chicago from 1983-1992. AWK appeared nervous, but
eager to engage with a U.S. official. End Summary.

Focus on Kandahar
-----------------

¶2. (S//Rel NATO, ISAF) SCR told AWK the attention of the
Afghan government, with ISAF support, would turn to Kandahar
in the months ahead and it was likely this would be
predominantly a political contest that would require the
leadership from the highest level of the Afghan government.
SCR discussed the governance strategy for Kandahar City and
surrounding districts. AWK understood the next phase of
operation Moshtarak would be on Kandahar and offered his
support. SCR responded this would be an Afghan
Government-led effort and the coalition would be focusing its
resources on building up that capacity. SCR was clear the
coalition would not tolerate individuals working at odds to
ISAF campaign aims. AWK stated "nobody is that stupid."

Better Security and Economy in Kandahar
---------------------------------------

¶3. (S//Rel NATO, ISAF) AWK told the SCR that security has
improved in Kandahar over the past year. Freedom of movement
had increased across the province, he said, citing his
driving to the meeting at Kandahar Airfield with minimum
security. AWK said insurgents no longer have the capability
to launch large scale attacks; for example, AWK does not fear
an insurgent attack on his home. AWK expressed concern about
a series of assassinations aimed at Afghan officials and
Afghan citizens who work for the coalition in the city,
noting this could only be solved by intelligence assets. AWK
said economic activity had increased in the Kandahar City
area, but noted his belief that President Karzai is largely
unaware of these gains. AWK told the President about
increased economic activity in Arghandab related to AVIPA
Plus and the President was very surprised, he said. AWK said
the President did not understand the changing circumstances
in the province.

Kandahar Politics Are Local
---------------------------

¶4. (S//Rel NATO, ISAF) AWK said that it was important to get
district-level tribal dynamics right to bring stability to
Kandahar City and its environs. AWK specifically stated the
need to rely on local, village elders to choose
representatives to district shuras. This would ensure a
representative shura for district level officials, said AWK
and pointed to the succession of Arghandab-based Alikozai
leader Mullah Naqib. AWK said the Alikozais chose Mullah
Naqib's son, Karimullah, to lead the Alikozai. SCR pointed
out coalition conventional wisdom that President Karzai had
interfered in that process to appoint Karimullah, which led
to certain Alikozai elements to support the Taliban in
Arghandab. AWK said, unconvincingly, this was not the case.
AWK then contradicted himself and said Karimullah, in fact,
did not lead the Alikozai, but AWK's deputy at the provincial
council Dastegeeri, was the most influential Alikozai in
Kandahar.

Police in the South xxxxxxxxxxxx
----------------------------------------

¶5. (S//Rel NATO, ISAF) SCR told AWK the coalition would not
accept powerbroker interference with the police and used the
example of citizens in Marjah telling Marines they would not

Kabul 00000693 002 of 003


support GIRoA due to past xxxxxxxxxxxx abuses xxxxxxxxxxxx
Kandahar does not have similar issues
of interference with the police, he said, but SCR pressed
saying we are aware of a recent incident when the Kandahar
governor sought to remove the Panjwa'i chief of police, but
someone had intervened to halt that removal. AWK, who is
believed to have prevented Governor Weesa from firing the
police chief, said the governor had the power to remove
police officials and should exercise that authority in
Panjwa'i. AWK characterized Governor Weesa as honest and a
powerful figure in Kandahar, but he needed to be more
aggressive. In the same breath, AWK said he was the most
powerful official in Kandahar and could deliver whatever is
needed.

Capture of Mullah Baradar
-------------------------

¶6. (S//Rel NATO, ISAF) SCR asked AWK his views on the recent
capture in Pakistan of Taliban leader Mullah Baradar. AWK
said Pakistan detained Baradar and other Taliban leaders
because they were prepared to discuss reintegration with the
Karzai government. Senior Taliban fighters in Pakistan may
be prepared to reintegrate, he said, but are forced by the
Pakistan Government to continue to fight. AWK said some
Afghan Taliban commanders cannot return to Afghanistan
because they are on the Joint Priority Effects List (JPEL)
and are told by the Pakistanis they must continue to fight or
will be turned over to the coalition. It is important to
remove such fighters from the JPEL for reintegration to work,
he argued, adding that he has been working on the
reconciliation issue with the Saudis for two-three years.
AWK offered a meeting with SCR and his older brother and
former Member of Parliament for Kandahar Kayyum Karzai in the
next few weeks to discuss ongoing reintegration discussions
with the Saudis.

Drug Trafficker: Where is the Polygraph?
----------------------------------------

¶7. (S//Rel NATO, ISAF) Unprompted, AWK raised allegations of
his involvement in narcotics, telling the SCR that he is
willing to take a polygraph anytime, anywhere to prove his
innocence and that he has hired an attorney in New York to
clear his name. He suggested that the coalition pay mullahs
to preach against heroin, which would reduce demand for poppy
cultivation. AWK dismissed the narcotics allegations as part
of a campaign to discredit him, particularly by the media,
saying the allegations are "like a spice added to a dish to
make it more enticing to eat."

A Political Party for Southern Pashtuns?
-----------------------------------------

¶8. (S//Rel NATO, ISAF) SCR asked AWK if there are discussions
to create a Pashtun-oriented political party in the South.
AWK said such a party would be announced shortly and it would
encompass southern Pashtuns from Herat to Kandahar; Tajiks
also would be represented. AWK said Afghans are reluctant to
join political parties because they are associated with the
communist party and Islamic fundamentalist movements, like
the Taliban. He added that he could not be part of another
election because he had to personally manage promises to
hundreds of thousands of voters in the last election.

Gulaga Sherzai: Competitor
--------------------------

¶9. (S//Rel NATO, ISAF) SCR raised the recent 1,500 person
shura co-hosted by AWK and Sherzai in Kandahar City (Reftel
B). AWK said Sherzai was not to be trusted, but he was
willing to work with him on a peace jirga to deliver peace to
the south. AWK passionately presented his history of working
with the United States since 2001 and told the SCR that he
could deliver anything needed.

Missing Wrigley
---------------

¶10. (SBU//Rel NATO, ISAF) Further emphasizing his links to
the United States, AWK fondly recalled his days in Chicago as
a restaurant owner close to Chicago's Wrigley Field. His

Kabul 00000693 003 of 003


restaurant was a hub for American in the Midwest who had
worked or lived in Afghanistan prior to the Soviet invasion,
he said.

Comment
-------

¶11. (S//Rel NATO, ISAF) AWK was eager to engage and rarely
stopped talking in the two hour meeting. While he presented
himself as a partner to the United States and is eager to be
seen as helping the coalition, he also demonstrated that he
will dissemble when it suits his needs. He appears not to
understand the level of our knowledge of his activities, and
that the coalition views many of his activities as malign,
particularly relating to his influence over the police. We
will need to monitor his activity closely, and deliver a
recurring, transparent message to him of where are redlines
are and what we expect of him in the months ahead.
Ricciardone

" http://www.wikileaks.ch/cable/2010/02/10KABUL693.html

[mightiswrong]

"VZCZCXRO0787
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INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 003068

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SRAP, SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM
STATE PASS USAID FOR ASIA/SCAA
USFOR-A FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/27/2019
TAGS: KDEM MOPS PGOV PREL AF
SUBJECT: AHMED WALI KARZAI AND GOVERNOR WEESA ON GOVERNANCE
IN KANDAHAR

Classified By: Interagency Provincial Affairs Deputy Coordinator Hoyt Y
ee for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: in a lengthy and cordial introductory meeting
with Kandahar Provincial Council Chief Ahmed Wali Karzai
(AWK) and Governor Tooryalai Weesa, Senior Civilian
Representative (SCR) for the South Frank Ruggiero underscored
the need for improved governance in Kandahar, and highlighted
the importance of naming credible provincial governors and
district officials before the inauguration to send a positive
signal on good governance to the Afghan people and the
international community. Both AWK and Weesa acknowledged the
weakness of the government in Kandahar, and outlined their
proposals for local solutions, including the empowerment of
shuras of district elders for local dispute resolution rather
than the courts. AWK also emphasized large-scale
infrastructure projects rather than smaller cash-for-work
program, and his desire to see private security companies in
the province under one licensee. AWK discounted the role of
elections and their importance to Afghans. End Summary.

AWK Nervous but Eager to Share Views
----------------------------------

¶2. (C) SCR Ruggiero met with AWK and Governor Weesa on
September 28 in the Governor's Palace in Kandahar City. The
Representative of Canada in Kandahar (RoCK) Ben Rowswell also
attended the meeting, which was held in a wood-paneled room,
beneath a large photo of President Hamid Karzai. (Note:
While we must deal with AWK as the head of the Provincial
Council, he is widely understood to be corrupt and a
narcotics trafficker. End Note) AWK, dressed in a crisp
white shalwar kameez and pinstriped vest, appeared nervous,
though eager to express his views on the international
presence in Kandahar.

The Importance of Good Governance
------------------------------

¶3. (C) SCR emphasized the criticality of good governance in
the province, and said the United States would like to see
improvement in the post-election period. He said the United
States is ready to work with the GIRoA to strengthen key
provincial and district level governance, but we are only
willing to expend our resources in people and programs if we
have confidence those resources will pay off and make a real
difference.

¶4. (C) Both AWK and Weesa acknowledged there was a
credibility gap between the public and the government. Weesa
said it was a problem that in the 10 months he had been in
office, the government had not been able to deliver 24-hour
electricity to the people, and that 150 factories had closed
because of it. He said people looked to NGOs more than to
the government to deliver services, and he complained that
NGOs poach workers from the government by offering higher
wages. SCR emphasized the importance of naming credible
provincial governors and district officials before the
inauguration to send a positive signal on good governance to
the Afghan people and the international community.

¶5. (C) AWK suggested one way of fighting corruption in the
province would be to re-establish and empower district
shuras, instead of judges or police, to settle local
disputes. Currently there is only one judge for the five
districts around Kandahar City, he said, and a council of
local elders would be more effective at resolving land, water
and other disputes. (Note: there are a total of seven judges
for all 17 districts in the province.) "You can easily bribe
the chief of police or a judge,8 he said, &but you can't
bribe 50 elders." He said the provincial council, with the
support of the governor, could initiate the formation of
these district shuras, which would consist of 10-15 elders
elected by the people.

Infrastructure Priorities, Private Security Contractors and
Conflicts of Interest
--------------------------------------------- -----------------

¶6. (C) AWK said he had been in Kandahar almost continuously
since 1992, and that the U.S. reputation in the province was
built on the back of two key infrastructure projects done in
the 1950s and 60s. He said what would make a difference to
the population today would be similar large-scale,
labor-intensive projects that would provide jobs to the
people and keep them from being recruited by the Taliban.
AWK cautioned against the use of small scale projects and

KABUL 00003068 002 OF 002


additional cash-for-work programs; he stated that the use of
implementing partners does not allow expenditure of
development resources to reach villagers and other local
Afghans. Both he and Weesa added that it should be the local
elders who are empowered to distribute these jobs, not
officials or companies from outside.

Putting Private Security Under the Direction of the
Provincial Council
--------------------------------------------- --

¶7. (C) In the same vein of providing "local solutions to
local problems," as he put it, AWK recommended a "local
solution" to the problem of providing security in the area.
He said that currently, there are many jihadi commanders with
militias who independently provide protection to convoys and
projects, but that a proposal before the Ministry of Interior
would bring all these commanders under one umbrella in
Kandahar, with one person given the license for the private
security sector. He said there would be a meeting Wednesday
(September 30) of all the security companies, under the
auspices of the Provincial Council, to appoint this
representative to send to Kabul. (Note: AWK is understood to
have a stake in private security contracting, and has
aggressively lobbied the Canadians to have his security
services retained for the Dahla Dam refurbishment. Both he
and the governor have tried to exert control over how
contracts are awarded in the province ) all of which could
be a significant conflict of interest in the province. End
Note.)

Elections: What's the Point?
---------------------

¶8. (C) In answer to a question from the RoCK and the SCR
about the credibility of the elections, AWK said democracy
was new for Afghanistan, and that people in the region did
not understand the point of having one election, let alone
two. "The people do not like change," he said. "They think,
the President is alive, and everything is fine. Why have an
election?"

Comment
-----

¶9. (C) The meeting with AWK highlights one of our major
challenges in Afghanistan: how to fight corruption and
connect the people to their government, when the key
government officials are themselves corrupt. Given AWK's
reputation for shady dealings, his recommendations for large,
costly infrastructure projects should be viewed with a
healthy dose of skepticism. Still, his observations about
the unintended consequences of how NGOs and other
international partners do their work, e.g. "poaching" of
government staff, track with some of our own concerns,
including about how to promote Afghan-led solutions. We will
continue to urge AWK to improve his own credibility gap as
well as that of the GIRoA.
EIKENBERRY"
http://www.wikileaks.ch/cable/2009/10/09KABUL3068.html

[mightiswrong]

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S E C R E T KABUL 002246

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SRAP, SCA/A, INL, EUR/PRM, INR, OSD FOR
FLOURNOY, CENTCOM FOR CG CJTF-82, POLAD, JICENT KABUL FOR
COS USFOR-A

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/01/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR AF
SUBJECT: COMPLAINTS TO GIROA ON PRE-TRIAL RELEASES AND
PARDONS OF NARCO-TRAFFICKERS

REF: REFTEL KABUL 02245

Classified By: DEPUTY AMBASSADOR FRANCIS J. RICCIARDONE FOR REASONS 1.4
(B) AND (D)

¶1. (S) SUMMARY: On numerous occasions we have emphasized with
Attorney General Aloko the need to end interventions by him
and President Karzai, who both authorize the release of
detainees pre-trial and allow dangerous individuals to go
free or re-enter the battlefield without ever facing an
Afghan court. On July 29th, Legal Adviser Harold Hongju Koh
and Deputy Ambassador Frances Ricciardone demarched Attorney
General Muhammad Ishaq Aloko about our concern over pre-trial
releases and presidential pardons of narco-traffickers
(Reftel Kabul 02245) In Spring 2008, Post had previous
demarched National Security Advisor Rassoul about our concern
over pre-trial releases. Despite our complaints and
expressions of concern to the GIRoA, pre-trial releases
continue. END SUMMARY

¶2. (S) Transfers from Bagram Theatre Internment Facility
(BTIF) to the Afghan National Detention Facility (ANDF) began
in Spring 2007. During that year, there was only one
pre-trial release. In 2008, there were 104 pre-trial
releases, almost all of which took place after President
Karzai formed the Aloko Detainee Commission in April 2008.
From January to March of 2009, there were 12 pre-trial
releases; and 23 pre-trial releases between April and June
¶2009. So far in July 2009, there have been 10 pre-trial
releases.

¶3. (S) An August 2005 exchange of diplomatic notes between
the USG and the GIRoA provides the legal basis for the
GIRoA,s detention and prosecution of detainees transferred
into Afghan custody. Even though a multi-agency GIRoA
delegation under the Aloko Detainee Commission screens all
BTIF detainees who are transferred to the ANDF and assures
the USG that these detainees will be prosecuted in an Afghan
court, there have been 150 detainees released from the ANDF
without trial since 2007, including 29 former Guantanamo Bay
(GTMO) detainees. The total number of transfers to date from
BTIF to ANDF is 629 detainees, plus 41 from GTMO.

-------------------------------
PROTECTION OF NARCOTRAFFICKERS
-------------------------------

¶4. (SBU) In April, President Karzai pardoned five border
policemen who were caught with 124 kilograms of heroin in
their border police vehicle. The policemen, who have come to
be known as the Zahir Five,, were tried, convicted and
sentenced to terms of 16 to 18 years each at the Central
Narcotics Tribunal. But President Karzai pardoned all five of
them on the grounds that they were distantly related to two
individuals who had been martyred during the civil war.

¶5. (S) Separately, President Karzai tampered with the
narcotics case of Haji Amanullah, whose father is a wealthy
businessman and one of his supporters. Without any
constitutional authority, Karzai ordered the police to
conduct a second investigation which resulted in the
conclusion that the defendant had been framed. XXXXXXXXXXXXX told
XXXXXXXXXXXX he was ashamed,, of the president for his
interference in this case and the case of the Zahir Five.

¶6. (S) In another case, a CJTF investigation concluded that
26 kilograms of heroin seized from a vehicle search belonged
to Col. Jaweed, Chief of the Highway Police for Badakshan
Province. Jaweed is the nephew of a powerful member of
Parliament. Eventually, he was arrested and is currently
serving in Pol-i-Charkhi prison. But, there is credible, but
unconfirmed, intelligence indicating that President Karzai
has signed a letter pardoning Jaweed that has not yet been
delivered to the Supreme Court. Daudzai denied any
significant pressure in this case.

¶7. (S) Unconfirmed intelligence also indicates that President
Karzai is planning to release drug trafficker Ismal Safed,
who is serving a 19-year sentence in Pol-i-Charkhi. Safed is
a priority DEA target who was arrested in 2005 in possession
of large quantities of heroin and a cache of weapons. In
2008, DEA conducted an operation in which an undercover
officer purchased approximately three kilograms of heroin
directly from Safed. Daudzai told the Deputy Ambassador that
President Karzai will not pardon Safed, and that Post,s
concerns about this case will reaffirm President Karzai,s
decision not to interfere.
EIKENBERRY"
http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2009/08/09KABUL2246.html

[bukowski]

Tell us something we dont know



This image also show production from MYANMAR which many ZOG nations still call BURMA, despite the countries legitimate right to change thier name



notice how Myanmar production is falling to a record low, we can expect a mission to 'restore democracy' to myanmar sometime soon, any country that messes with the world drug trade is in for a 'regime change'

wikileaks states the bloody obvious, what the bloggers and alternative media has been saying for years, and now the mainstream accepts it as 'fact' because the controlled PSY-op 'wikileaks' is 'releasing' it?
what a pantomime

[mightiswrong]

Originally Posted by bukowski

wikileaks states the bloody obvious, what the bloggers and alternative media has been saying for years, and now the mainstream accepts it as 'fact' because the controlled PSY-op 'wikileaks' is 'releasing' it?
what a pantomime

Whether http://www.truth-out.org is mainstream or not and whether wikileaks is a psy op or not is irrelevent to the value of the leaked documents in proving what had only been said.

[gestaltdude]

If the mainstream mdia pick up on this (which they wont) the smeg (cant use other words, kids in the room) will definitely be hitting the fan.

I would like to say that this has always been problems with these wikileaks things. When it was a couple of submissions, like that chopper video, it was fine. However when there are nudreds of thousands, how can anyone find anything of value? The only things that every come out are those reported in the media, ie those they want yo to know.

[mightiswrong]

Originally Posted by gestaltdude

However when there are nudreds of thousands, how can anyone find anything of value?

Try http://www.reddit.com/r/Leakspin/ and http://operationleakspin.org/

[bukowski]

Originally Posted by mightiswrong

Whether http://www.truth-out.org is mainstream or not and whether wikileaks is a psy op or not is irrelevent to the value of the leaked documents in proving what had only been said.

I don't see how having the info documented by 'intelligence' reports makes it any more 'proven' than the figures that have clearly demonstrate the opium flow is 'coalition' driven for years. I worked it out in 2005 after constant news that most of the herion was coming from afghanistan.
Even junkies are noticing that "there is a lot of good gear around since 2001"
, if they can add 2 + 2 and get 4 , why do we need 'intelligence reports' to convince the folk who still want to kid themselves that 2+2 = 5?

remember it was bogus 'intelligence reports' (mosad lies) about bin ladin and his band of merry men that got the 'coalition' (more like drug syndicate) into Afghanistan in the first place

the only value in 'intelligence reports' "proving" the heroin links is that i can now say "i told you so" to all the sheep who could not add 2+2 for themselves (smug)

[mightiswrong]

Well I suppose the media & academics are more likely to quote US intelligence documents than the word on the street from junkies.

[bukowski]

Originally Posted by mightiswrong

Well I suppose the media/ academics are more likely to quote US intelligence documents than the word on the street from junkies.

And THAT is where they are going wrong

[mightiswrong]

Possibly but it is a good excuse to publish the story and media can use the intelligence documents to support the circumstantial evidence from the streets making a stronger overall case.

Also it helps expose those media if they covered up the big story that sold loads of newspapers whilst they risked loosing sales to a competitior who printed it first.